5. The Role of the Censor

25 November – the first censorship controls

The earliest interrogation reports reaching Navy Office suggested that the ship from which the rescued Germans had come had been sunk by a cruiser. Briefing papers warned the Chief of Naval Staff and the Minister for the Navy that ‘The above must be kept most secret, as enemy are probably unaware of situation.’[60] Yet 24 hours later, on 25 November, the day Frederick Shedden advised the Prime Minister in a ‘most secret’ minute of the Chief of Naval Staff’s fears that the Sydney had been sunk, public rumours of the Sydney’s loss had already begun to spread. This was five days before the Prime Minister publicly announced the loss.

The Government was well aware of the damage that would be done to national morale by disclosure of the Sydney’s loss. However, from the records it appears that the main reason it delayed an announcement and imposed blanket censorship restrictions on any news of the Sydney was the Navy’s concern that an enemy supply vessel may have scheduled a rendezvous with the Kormoran. It did not wish to scare off such a vessel by prematurely announcing details of the Kormoran’s sinking. Intelligence summaries prepared as late as 3 December still referred to the possibility of there being a supply vessel or second raider in the area.[61]

Despite the Government’s concern that nothing be disclosed, by the afternoon of 25 November The Herald in Melbourne had heard that an Australian warship had been sunk. Earlier that day G Hermon Gill, the Navy’s Publicity Censorship Liaison Officer, advised the Chief of Naval Staff that ‘to issue a censorship instruction at this stage would be to start a flood of rumour throughout Press channels’. This is precisely what ensued.[62]

Unknown to Gill, the Chief Publicity Censor in the Department of Information, E G Bonney had received instructions from the Minister for Information that day to issue a censorship instruction prohibiting any mention of HMAS Sydney. Accordingly, a censorship instruction was issued at 2.30 that afternoon to all newspapers and radio stations throughout Australia:

FC756: Pending further advice no reference press or broadcasting to HMAS Sydney.

In order to prevent publication of anything in the afternoon press the Chief Publicity Censor himself telephoned the Melbourne Herald to pass on the censorship instruction. He was told that the Herald’s Canberra representative had already telephoned to say that an Australian warship had been sunk, and that in view of the instruction it must be HMAS Sydney.

It was immediately realised that the reference to HMAS Sydney in the censorship instruction was a mistake. Gill informed the Chief of Naval Staff that it had been issued ‘without receiving any direction from Navy’.[63] Gill arranged for the Censor to issue a further instruction the same afternoon:

FC757: No reference whatever press or radio to any statements or rumours regarding alleged naval activity Australian waters.

The text of the two instructions was sent to the Publicity Censors in all capital cities and Launceston, and despatched by signal to the Admiralty, the Commander in Chief China Station, the Commander in Chief East Indies, and the New Zealand Naval Board.

Informing the next of kin

On 26 November the War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council decided that the spread of rumour about the Sydney was so great that it had little choice but to inform the next of kin. There was disagreement about this in the War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council, the concern being that it would give valuable information to the enemy. The Rt. Hon. W M Hughes was most strongly opposed to the proposal. He considered that telling the next of kin was tantamount to telling the world. With Hughes dissenting, it was agreed that the next of kin would be informed in a way that did not convey useful information to the enemy.[64] The text of the telegram sent to the next of kin reflected the Government’s concern to release as little information as possible. A copy of a telegram sent to one of the six members of the RAAF on board the Sydney at the time of its loss appears in Chapter 7.

On the day the next of kin were informed, Navy Office drafted a brief prime ministerial statement in the event that a public statement was to be made. However, the Chief of Naval Staff accepted Gill’s recommendation that a public statement should not be issued because ‘The fate of Sydney is at present unknown (and) presumably the fate of the raider is not known to Germany.’ It was decided that ‘complete public silence should be maintained, even though next of kin are informed’ and that ‘release of any statement, when made, should be simultaneous in Australia, New Zealand, Britain and Singapore.’

It was also agreed that Gill in Melbourne and the Naval Staff Officers, Intelligence in other cities would arrange to ‘communicate personally and verbally to newspaper editors, the position, and explain reasons for censorship ban... This will satisfy and quieten the Press – which is already aware of some happenings [Gill’s emphasis] – and enlist their cooperation.’

This secret briefing did not succeed in ‘quietening’ the press. The next day, 27 November, in response to growing demands for permission to publish details, a further censorship instruction was issued:

FC758: Prohibition in FC756 is absolute for the present stop use of name mentioned in that instruction must be avoided.

The same day the Naval Board advised the Admiralty that the leakages of information that had already occurred in Australia and the widespread rumour following the release of information to the next of kin may force the Australian Government to make an early public statement.

The Naval Board’s concern about the leakage of information about the Sydney was summarised in a minute to the Prime Minister several weeks later by the acting Chief of Naval Staff. In a letter dated 13 December 1941 Commodore Durnford observed

‘The unfortunate chain of events following the Sydney leakage is fresh in memory. It may, however, be remarked that owing to that leakage:-

1. Next of kin notices had to be issued prematurely on Wednesday 26 November, owing to the wild spread of rumour, at a stage when nothing was known of the fate of HMAS Sydney.
2. Rumour got quite out of hand, and the most extravagant stories circulated throughout Australia, and continue to circulate.
3. As a result the Government was forced to issue an official statement at a time when it was most desirable to keep from the enemy the news that our Naval strength had been reduced so drastically, and again at a time when it was not possible to give a final picture of the happening. But for the leakage, it would have been possible to have delayed the issue of notices to next of kin until such time as:
   1. a complete story, devoid of false hope, could have been issued.
   2. strategical requirements had been satisfied.
   3. the official announcement could have been made immediately next of kin notices had been circulated, thus forestalling rumour. Much pain and anxiety would then have been spared the next of kin, and public morale would not have suffered from a surfeit of doubts and fears, as it undoubtedly did suffer.’

Durnford had no doubt that this and other recent leakages of secret naval information had occurred through Parliamentary press representatives in Canberra. He did not offer a view as to how they had obtained the information.

Pressure for the release of information

By 28 November the Prime Minister was receiving urgent telegrams from newspaper editors urging the release of information.

Place seething. Disturbing rumours. Urge immediate news (Daily News, Perth); and

Disappointed we unable relieve extreme anxiety. Great number people who concerned at persistent rumours Commonwealth loss. Many stories current and our view is that immediate steps should be taken to give people authentic report. In view public uneasiness and our embarrassment at daylong and anxious enquiries we implore you consider making immediate release. Could we expect reply urgent (Telegraph, Brisbane).

That day at an Advisory War Council meeting the Prime Minister and the other members present received first hand evidence of these rumours from the Hon. J McEwen, who reported rumours heard by his wife.[65] The Prime Minister responded to calls by the press for a statement by saying that “for vital strategical reasons’ the Admiralty and Navy were insisting there be no release until they so authorised. However, on the same day further information was secretly released to newspaper editors, the Navy fearing that not to keep them informed would see an end to their cooperation.[66]

A revised Prime Ministerial statement based on the latest information was drafted, but the Naval Board urged that when released the statement should be for press only, with no broadcast or release overseas for 48 hours after its release in Australia. Radio reports concerning the loss of the Kormoran might be picked up by the supply ship that was believed to be still in the area.

Such concerns appear to have been futile. Colonel Roberts, the Acting Director of Military Intelligence reported that at about 6.30 pm that day his son heard a broadcast from a radio station in California, giving details of the Sydney’s loss. Gill’s minute informing the Acting Chief of Naval Staff of this was annotated by the Acting CNS ‘If true, this implies leakage by W/T or cable on which we are supposed to be 100% efficient (or plane passenger).’

It was also on 28 November that the Prime Minister ordered that copies of the full casualty lists be air mailed to each State capital to allow ‘prompt release to newspapers when release is approved’. In response to the ensuing pressure from the press for permission to publish the names of the Sydney’s crew a further censorship instruction was issued.

FC762: No publication any RAN personnel reported missing until official casualty list issues.

A number of additional censorship instructions were issued over the following days which prohibited the reporting of the arrival of the German prisoners in Fremantle, and a reminder to the press that the Prime Minister’s statement was not to be published or broadcast before the permitted times. In all, 11 censorship instructions were issued, and remained in force until 3 December.

1 December – The Prime Minister’s statement

The Prime Minister’s brief statement, with two amendments suggested by the Admiralty, was officially released to newspapers late on 30 November for publication the next day. The statement bore the caveat

Not to be broadcast by any Australian radio station. Not to be cabled outside Australia.

As requested by the Navy, a 48 hour embargo had been agreed on broadcast transmissions of the statement, to give the Navy every chance of intercepting the Kormoran’s supply ship.

On the day of release, three radio stations, 3AR, 3KZ and 2UW had broken the broadcasting embargo and as a consequence had their services temporarily suspended. 3KZ had broadcast extracts of the Prime Minister’s statement from the morning’s press, while 3AR had played the hymn Lead Kindly Light ‘in memory of the brave boys of the Sydney’.

It could not be known at the time that all these precautions were in vain. Research papers prepared for the Official War Historian G Hermon Gill state that ‘German Naval Authorities received the first report of the Sydney-Kormoran battle on 24 November 1941 by means of a transmission from a Sydney W/T station, which transmitted the request to a steamer at sea “Report details of battle and ship’s name as gathered from survivors.” As Kormoran was the only raider at sea the Naval Staff knew on 30 November, when an Admiralty report of 26th was decyphered, that Ship 41 [Kormoran] had gone down’.[67]

Unaware of this, the Navy continued to oppose the release of anything more than the Prime Minister had announced. His press statement had hardly been informative, and rumours continued to circulate. On the day of the Prime Minister’s statement, his private secretary sent a message to the Secretary of the Department of the Navy:

Rumours regarding HMAS Sydney continue to be received by press representatives here from their state offices as being current in capital cities. Latest is that Sydney has been discovered on Western Australian coast. It is realised that Prime Minister will be advised immediately anything factual of importance re Sydney is to hand and foregoing is for information.

The same morning the press were already asking the Prime Minister to release more information for the afternoon papers, and to approve the publication of details they had obtained in unauthorised interviews with the German prisoners. The Perth Daily News again sent a telegram to the Prime Minister: ‘Urge strongly prisoners story action publishable without disclosing enemy’s name or locality. See no possible strategic or other objection. Can you help us.’

Still mindful of the need to keep as much as possible from the enemy, the Prime Minister replied ‘Security negates present publication of accounts emanating German sources’ and asked the Chief Publicity Censor to request copies of these interviews for his scrutiny so that once censored they could be released to all newspapers. Ultimately publication was refused by the Censor.[68] The Prime Minister’s statement of 3 December giving the ‘broad canvas’ of what was known was the extent of what the Government was prepared to release.

The pressure to release information was not confined to Australia. The New Zealand Government objected to the continued prohibition on publication of the details in New Zealand despite the arrival there on the afternoon of 1 December of Australian newspapers containing the details of the Prime Minister’s announcement. Initially the Naval Board refused the New Zealand Government’s request to permit publication of the information in New Zealand, but on the 2 December agreed to release the information there, but to continue the ban on broadcasting.

The Government was also embarrassed as a result of a broadcast on 2 December by the British Broadcasting Corporation which gave the name and description of the Kormoran, information which was still subject to censorship restrictions in Australia. In a cablegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 6 December the Prime Minister protested at the Australian Government’s serious embarrassment. He reported that the Australian press were ‘incensed’ at the restrictions imposed on them when the same restrictions were not imposed on the BBC and the British press, and said that the pressure resulting from the release, against which the Commonwealth Government ‘had no valid defence’ had forced the ‘premature release of other material it was desirable for the time being to withhold.’

Continued restrictions on the release of information

Throughout the remainder of the war the press continued to publish stories about the fate of the Sydney, sometimes against the wishes of the authorities. For example, stories about the Sydney-Kormoran action published in New York in March 1943 and re-published in Australian newspapers attracted the attention of Naval Intelligence. In a minute to the Chief of Naval Staff R B M Long, the Director of Naval Intelligence reported

‘The attached articles published in this morning’s papers [from The Argus, The Sun and The Age] give the true and full story of the Sydney-Kormoran action. Obviously there has been a leakage’ (the leakage was later reported by Long to have been from US naval authorities).

Long subsequently recommended to the Prime Minister’s Press Secretary by telephone that the Prime Minister should try to evade answering questions from journalists about the articles because if he stated that the story was true, the press and the public would inevitably ask him why he had not released it earlier himself. On the other hand, if he said the story was unconfirmed and to be viewed with suspicion because it was coming from prisoner of war reports, the press and public ‘will be entitled to reply that as he must know the full story why can he not release it.’

Explaining why the stories were passed by the Censor, Long told the Chief of Naval Staff that they contained ‘certain unimportant details not previously published in Australia’, and that ‘all the relevant facts’ were published in Australia in December 1941. Gill, who was still the Navy’s Publicity Censorship Liaison Officer, had requested the State Publicity Censor to

‘completely ban’ the story from publication in Australia because:

1. it was digging up a story that had been dead for 15 months;
2. it threw no new light on the subject;
3. it could be harmful to morale, and hurtful to next of kin.

The press was subsequently permitted to publish the stories because the State Publicity Censor decided that Gill’s reasons could not justify their suppression and his objections were therefore overridden.

Official reluctance to release additional information continued after the war, with the refusal of the Director of Naval Intelligence to publish an account of the action between the Sydney and the Kormoran prepared by Naval Intelligence staff in Fremantle. The details of this are given in the Introduction to this guide.

The records which deal mainly with aspects of the censorship of information about the Sydney are described below.