The 2004 Cabinet papers in context

Introduction

When Prime Minister John Howard called an election in August 2004, the Liberal and National parties had been in office for eight years.1 They appeared to be either on level terms with, or trailing, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Opposition in the opinion polls.2 As the campaign started, Howard described the election result as ‘very much in the balance’.3 The result on 9 October was that the Liberal and National parties were returned to office with an increased share of the vote and more seats.4

The documents released this year are a selection of some of the records of the federal Cabinet and its powerful National Security Committee (NSC). As 2004 was an election year, it was natural that particular attention would be given to some politically sensitive ‘bread and butter’ issues in areas such as health, welfare and education. Nonetheless, matters of national security, defence, foreign affairs, trade and immigration continued to be important subjects for the Cabinet’s consideration. This was because the ‘war on terror’ had broadened from Afghanistan to Iraq, while Australia continued its regional presence in places such as Timor-Leste (East Timor), Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. In defence policy, moreover, Australia was on the cusp of a transition away from the self-reliant ‘Defence of Australia’ strategy that had been set out in the Defence White Paper of 1987.5 During a time of drought, climate change remained a sensitive issue that needed to be harmonised with the government’s energy policy and other environmental policies. 

This is the first time that NSC documents which were not referred to full Cabinet have been included in the release. For that reason, the examination of records under the Archives Act in respect of these records has been much more complex than in the past. 

This paper is based on documents made available to the Cabinet historian by 14 October 2024. The Cabinet historian received access-examined copies of the records selected for release, but did not have ‘official’ access to exempt information. The selected documents are discussed in six sections: national security, defence, foreign affairs, trade and Intelligence matters; economic, social welfare, health, education and immigration policies; climate change, energy, heritage and the environment; transport, infrastructure, communications, legal issues and cultural affairs; rural and regional issues, water and mining; Indigenous policy.6  

The ordering of these sections does not necessarily indicate any judgement as to their weight or importance but has been designed to give readers a thematic sense of the range and variety of the matters dealt with by Cabinet in 2004. 

National security, defence, foreign affairs, trade and intelligence matters

This section groups together matters of national security, defence, foreign affairs, trade and intelligence. It is the longest section in the paper because of Australia’s involvement in war in Iraq and the ongoing ‘war on terror’, the continuing importance of regional affairs (for example, Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea) and the large range of items concerning matters of defence policy and procurement. According to Professor Patrick Weller, Howard’s three principal Cabinet committees were the NSC, the decisions of which could stand on their own; the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC); and the Parliamentary Business Committee (PBC). Howard regarded establishing the NSC as ‘one of the most successful administrative decisions I took’.7 

Iraq continued to be a major focus of the NSC in 2004.8 The first phase of the invasion of Iraq ended in May 2003 when US President George W Bush declared the ‘end of major combat operations’.9 A Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established as the first of several successive transition governments in Iraq. Under the leadership of Paul W Bremer, the CPA dissolved the Iraqi army and other Ba’athist state entities. Meanwhile, a comprehensive search failed to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

 In January 2004 the Bush Administration conceded that its prewar arguments that Iraq possessed extensive stockpiles of chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons – the ostensible basis of Australia’s involvement in the war – were without foundation.10 The performance of Australian intelligence agencies in regard to their assessments of Iraq’s possession of WMD became the subject of an inquiry whose recommendations were accepted, except for one suggesting a possible change to the name of the Office of National Assessments (ONA).11 

The Australian Defence Department had been given supplementary funding of $644.7 million over three years to cover the net additional cost of operations in Iraq (under Operations Bastille, Falconer and Catalyst).12  In February 2004 the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, emphasised that a continued Australian military presence in Iraq was a ‘demonstrable example of our commitment to the United States alliance, and our willingness to help the United States address international threats and promote global security’.13 It was in Australia’s interests, Hill added, that Iraq evolve into a pluralist country that promoted the free market as the dominant form of economic organisation.14 

During 2004, however, the achievement of political stability for Iraq was undermined by sectarian strife and a growing insurgency against the Coalition occupiers.15 In March 2004 the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda launched waves of suicide bombings and strikes against Muslim holy sites in Baghdad and Karbala.16 The escalating violence prompted the NSC to agree in July to increase the Security Detachment in Iraq, to rotate the Australian Army Training Team Iraq and to embed 20 medical personnel in Coalition medical facilities.17 That same month, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, warned the NSC that Australia’s Iraq engagement strategy had to be based on the assumption that Australian nationals would be targeted by insurgents, including possible kidnapping.18 

By this time, the legitimacy of the US-led occupation of Iraq had been further undermined when evidence of prisoner abuse inside the US-run Abu Ghraib prison became public in April 2004.19 The US government remained committed, however, to transferring some authority to the interim Iraqi government established on 28 June 2004.20  

Given the political sensitivities about the ongoing Coalition presence in Iraq, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) pressed the United States and other countries for confirmation of the Multi-National Force – Iraq’s (MNF) mandate and for an expression of Iraqi consent to the continuing international presence in the country. On 10 May 2004 the NSC agreed that, subject to satisfactory resolution of the legal issues surrounding its deployments, Australia should extend its advisory presence in the Iraqi Ministries of Agriculture, Planning and Development Cooperation, and Defence, and continue ‘its engagement and capacity-building strategies not involving an in-country presence in Iraq, such as hosting of visits to Australia by key Iraqis and the provision of training outside Iraq’.21

On 8 June 2004 the UN Security Council endorsed the formation of the interim Iraqi government and determined the MNF’s relationship with that government. The Australian Representative Office was duly converted into an embassy. In the meantime, Australian lobbying of the CPA helped secure legal privileges and immunities for official Australian military and civilian personnel in Iraq through CPA Order 17, which Bremer signed as one of his last acts after having secured the agreement of incoming Iraqi prime minister Ayad Allawi.22  

After the establishment of the new Iraqi government, Australia’s rehabilitation strategy was adjusted to place greater emphasis on visits to Australia and training there rather than on the deployment of experts to Iraq.23 Downer noted, however, that the interim Iraqi government and the new UN Security Council Resolution 1546 were ‘unlikely to lead to major increases in international support, or much improve popular perceptions of the Coalition as an occupying force’.24 

The continuing relationship between Australian Wheat Board Limited (AWB) and Iraq was a particularly important Australian interest in that country. Mark Vaile, Minister for Trade, warned Cabinet of intensifying competition in the wheat trade with Iraq, adding that ‘[o]ne issue to watch will be current United Nations, Iraqi and US inquiries into abuse of the UN Oil-for-Food Program[me], which US Wheat Associates has already used to criticise AWB Limited’s dealings with Iraq under Saddam’.25 Reports into commercial corruption of the program were released in October 2005. This created pressure for an Australian royal commission that found, when it was completed in 2006, that the AWB had paid ‘transportation fees’ of around A$290 million to Saddam Hussein’s government in the years before the war.26 In other trade matters, the Cabinet finalised free trade agreements with the United States and Thailand.27 

Closer to home, Downer received NSC approval to continue the Australian contribution to an extended UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste through to May 2005.28 In respect of participation in non-regional peacekeeping missions, Hill recommended that preference be given to options that were consistent with Australia’s objectives in the ‘war on terror’.29 

Several Cabinet submissions relate to negotiations over maritime boundaries, including with Timor-Leste.30 The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), it was later alleged, had in 2004 clandestinely placed listening devices in a room adjacent to the Timor-Leste prime minister’s office in Dili to obtain information favourable to Australia in negotiations over the oil and gas fields in the Timor Gap.31 Nothing in the selected Cabinet papers bears on this affair, but another Cabinet paper is concerned with approval for the Director-General of ASIS to issue guidelines for staff members and agents in the use of weapons and self-defence techniques. The submission noted that ‘ASIS envisages needing to provide weapons to its staff members and agents only on very rare occasions’.32  

Australia’s maritime zones overlapped with Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and New Zealand. Apart from the ongoing negotiations with Timor-Leste, the only other major outstanding boundary demarcation in 2004 was with New Zealand.33 Downer took the lead in the Howard government’s response to a Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee’s inquiry into the Bali terrorist bombings in 2002. The report found that there was no clear intelligence warning which, if identified and acted on, could have prevented the bombings. The Cabinet endorsed qualified support for the committee’s recommendation on the need for wider dissemination of travel advice. It rejected other recommendations calling for the introduction of mandatory obligations on travel agents and for the distribution of classified Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) threat assessments to the public.34  

Related submissions concerned the government’s White Paper on Terrorism, published in July 2004, and a counter-terrorism exercise, Mercury 04, held in the Timor Sea.35 Another had to do with allocating responsibilities and capabilities between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and civil authorities for the security of offshore oil and gas facilities and the offshore interdiction of ships at sea.36 

The Cabinet papers contain many submissions on defence matters and defence procurement that reflected a broadening of Australian strategy beyond the concept of ‘Defence of Australia’.37 Hill proposed eight major measures for the 2004–05 Budget with a combined fiscal impact of $2,008 million over the forward estimates. These included four new measures relating to Operation Relex II (the ADF’s border control operations), the commercialisation of the Defence Housing Authority, Papua New Guinea defence reform and implementation of the Defence Procurement Review.38 To improve the defence procurement process, the NSC agreed to establish a ‘two-pass’ system. The process involved two approval rounds, with each approval submission being considered by the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS) and then by the NSC. This process also necessitated the Department of Finance and Administration becoming more involved in the scrutiny and approval of detailed costings and financial risk assessments.39  

Noteworthy defence submissions concerned defence technology and missiles and electronic warfare. In respect of defence technology Hill alerted Cabinet to budget problems facing a Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Rationalisation Project at Fisherman’s Bend in Melbourne. The project, approved by parliament in 2000 at a cost of $56.2 million, was to deliver facilities to support DSTO’s advanced technology programs in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defences, as well as systems, propulsion and materials for aircraft, ships and submarines. Hill pointed out that these facilities were critical to Defence’s ability to understand and respond to threats from terrorism and WMD.40  

In respect of missiles, a submission was concerned with Australia’s decision in October 2003 to secure greater participation in the United States’ missile defence program. To that end, Hill sought NSC approval in 2004 to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Australian Department of Defence and the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The MOU, which sought to formalise Australia’s policy commitment and establish a framework for cooperation, was of 25 years’ duration rather than the customary 10 years.41  

One of the areas of Australia–US cooperation was a possible missile defence role for Australia’s proposed Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) which, at a cost of $5.5 billion, was to provide sustained maritime area defence for deployed forces.42 The AWD, with its anti-submarine and anti-shipping capability, would be a key component in operations in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood and ‘would be a particularly relevant option for coalition operations or in defence of Australia’.43 The electronic warfare submission stemmed from the ADF having learned that its aircraft in Iraq were vulnerable to shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile systems. Accordingly, Hill sought authority for funding for electronic warfare protection to protect aircraft and crew flying AP-3C Orion aircraft in Iraq.44 

During the 2004 federal election campaign there was a terrorist attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.45 At that time, defence and security personnel were deployed in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, in July 2003, Australia had landed troops in the Solomon Islands under the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Downer reported to the NSC in March 2004 that RAMSI had made good progress. Most of those responsible for the worst crimes during the ethnic tension in the Solomons were in jail; weapons had been surrendered or confiscated; a start had been made on putting the country’s finances on a sustainable footing; and donors had begun to re-engage with the Pacific country. Since the drawdown in late 2003 of the force protection component, security for RAMSI had been provided by a single, Australian-led company made up of troops from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga.46  

In respect of Papua New Guinea, Hill received NSC agreement for enhancements to the Defence Cooperation (DC) program, one of Australia’s oldest bilateral defence assistance relationships and the largest such program undertaken in 2004. These additions took place in the context of the agreement between the two countries in 2003 that an ‘Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP)’ would proceed with the objectives of increasing the capacity of PNG to achieve ‘good governance’.47 The NSC agreed to promote the development of the PNG Defence Force, including by placing ADF officers in key line positions.48 

Drawing on its opposition to the Iraq commitment in 2003, the Labor Opposition pledged to have the Australian troops in Iraq back home by Christmas.49 As Peter Costello recorded in his memoirs, ‘[t]he Iraq War was never popular in Australia, but … [the] promise was seen as ill considered. [It] played to anti-US sentiment but looked risky on great matters of national security’.50 

 

Economic, social welfare, health, education and immigration policies

Many of the Cabinet submissions relate to the Howard government’s policies in the areas of economic policy, social welfare, health, education and immigration. After Simon Crean stood down as Leader of the Opposition in November 2003, Mark Latham, the Member for Werriwa (Gough Whitlam’s old seat), succeeded him. The electorate initially responded so well to the new leader that, by March 2004, Latham was enjoying a higher personal approval rating than any Opposition Leader since Bob Hawke in 1983.51  

Early in his tenure as leader, in February 2004, Latham wrongfooted the government by announcing that the ALP would close the existing generous system of superannuation entitlements for federal politicians. This accompanied the Cabinet’s approval of a strategy of choice for superannuation. From 1 July 2005 Australians would be able to choose the superannuation fund into which their employers paid their super contributions.52 Latham’s attack on the generous arrangements for the superannuation of politicians proved too popular to resist.

Latham had less cause for optimism that the electorate would judge the government harshly on economic grounds. By the second half of 2004, business investment, commodity prices (particularly for iron ore), building approvals and average earnings were rising. Unemployment was falling and inflation was within the target range of the Reserve Bank of Australia. All these indices augured well for the election to be held on 9 October.53  

A worry for the government, however, was the escalation of house prices.54 Since the mid-1990s, these had risen to levels that put home ownership out of the reach of many aspiring homeowners. In August 2003 the government had asked the Productivity Commission to inquire into the affordability and availability of housing for families and individuals who wanted to own their own homes. In 2004 Cabinet agreed to support all the commission’s recommendations for boosting the supply of housing, as well as a recommendation that states and territories should reduce reliance on stamp duties on property conveyancing. The Cabinet did not consider, however, that the Commonwealth’s changes to capital gains tax arrangements in 1999 had had a large impact on house prices.55

In matters of health and social welfare, Cabinet agreed on measures to improve provision of after-hours GP services by establishing after-hours GP clinics.56 Overpayments in family tax benefits were also considered by Cabinet in 2004. As around 650,000 families had incurred overpayments, Senator Kay Patterson, Minister for Family and Community Services, and Treasurer Peter Costello made recommendations to Cabinet to reduce the size and incidence of overpayments.57 Patterson received support for a mandate to negotiate on supported accommodation with the states, and Julie Bishop, Minister for Ageing, for a new agreement with the states to provide for the care of the frail aged and people with disabilities.58  

Bishop made another submission to the Cabinet on the aged care industry, which had been the subject of a review conducted by Professor Warren Hogan. The Howard government’s Aged Care Act 1997 had increased private investment in the industry, which led to private equity firms, foreign investors, and superannuation and property real estate investment trusts entering the market. The 1997 legislation introduced greater reliance on resident contributions to the cost of aged care, including through a system of accommodation bonds and residential care benefits subject to income testing. One of the consequences was the replacement of registered nurses in the industry with low-paid and low-skilled personal care workers who were often migrants.59  

Hogan’s review of aged care found that the residential aged care system was immature and inefficient. He also predicted that the labour market would come under pressure over the next decade owing to the inability of providers to secure the approximately $9.2 billion required for the industry. The Cabinet agreed to set up an interdepartmental committee to devise an assistance package and identify capital options.60 Major investments in education and training were important commitments made by Howard during the election campaign. These included funding for 24 new Australian technical colleges and a significant boost for school infrastructure.61

Measures to combat trafficking in people continued to be a priority for the government in 2004.62 In August 2003 the Cabinet had agreed to a package of measures to prevent trafficking, to prosecute offenders and to support victims of that crime. Ministers involved in the package reported that its success was evidenced by there being less than 100 identified trafficked victims.63 In a related matter, Senator Amanda Vanstone, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, and Senator Ian Macdonald, Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, were given approval to revise arrangements for illegal fishers in Australia’s northern waters. As boat-based detention had become untenable as a strategy, the Cabinet agreed to move to long-term land-based detention arrangements.64 

In 2004, because of earlier measures taken against boat arrivals and people smuggling, Vanstone was able to add another 1,000 places to the government’s offshore Humanitarian Program, which comprised two components, the Refugee Program and Special Humanitarian Program (SHP), for 2004–05. During that period, 6,000 of the total 13,000 places in the Humanitarian Program were allocated to the Refugee Program and 7,000 for the SHP (a reduction of 1,000 places in that category compared to the 2003–04 program year).65  

Following from a decision in April 2002, the Cabinet had decided that the annual Migration (non-humanitarian) Program should be maintained within the range from 100,000 to 110,000 places per annum. Several factors affected the achievement of that target. These included a tightening of the labour market and low unemployment, growth in the number of overseas students seeking skilled migration visas after completing their studies, and an increase in state-specific categories and in skilled medical practitioners coming to Australia. 

Vanstone received the Cabinet’s approval to recalibrate the program to keep it in a range from 105,000 to 115,000 (plus a 5,000 contingency) by dampening the demand for overseas students seeking permanent residence, encouraging more skilled migration in regional Australia and adding an extra 1,000 places for doctors and their families under Medicare Plus. Vanstone was confident that the revised program would decrease the number of migrants settling in Sydney and increase those settling in regional Australia.66  
 

Climate change, energy, heritage and the environment

As Roger Beale has observed, the Howard government is noted for its achievements in energy policy. It helped to spur the resources boom and cultivate strategic links with China. Under its aegis, excise treatment of most fuels was standardised, integration of Australia’s electricity market was advanced and regulatory agencies for electricity and the transmission of gas were established. It also achieved a favourable outcome for Australia in the Kyoto climate change negotiations in 1997. Nonetheless, in climate change, the government failed to act. It chose neither to establish an overall emissions cap and trade system nor ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Beale concluded that:

His government bravely raised nuclear power but soon realised it was electoral poison. It was not forthright in its support of the mainstream climate science. These policy failures, and other factors, cost it dearly in the November 2007 election. But they cost the country more.67

The many Cabinet submissions in this section of the paper start with one from David Kemp, Minister for the Environment and Heritage, and Ian Macfarlane, Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources, who made a joint submission to Cabinet for a package of climate change measures that could be funded within the forward estimates for the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) during the period from FY2004–05 to FY2007–08.68  

Cabinet had agreed in 2003 that Australia’s climate change strategy should comprise action in four areas: international; climate change impacts and adaptation; fundamental measures (such as measurement and science); and emissions management. The package included funding for action on energy efficiency, local greenhouse action, low emissions technology and abatement, emissions measurement and a climate change science program.69 The most trenchant of the departmental criticisms of the submission came from the Treasury. It argued that the approach ‘creates sizeable fiscal risks for the government, is not cost effective, and fails to provide an integrated, whole-of-government response to climate change’.70 

Along with climate change, energy policy was a key area for Cabinet consideration in 2004. The Cabinet agreed in 2002 that an Energy Task Force would report to the new Energy Committee of Cabinet on energy policy issues. On 1 April 2004 the Energy Committee asked the task force to prepare an Energy Statement that brought together its work on seven areas of energy policy: market reform, security, resource development, innovation, efficiency, environment and taxation.71  

The Energy Task Force provided advice to Cabinet on calibrating policies to maximise the economic value of resources, to ensure an appropriate return to the community for depletable resources and to meet environmental and social objectives.72 The task force also advised on the role of technology and innovation to deliver the government’s objectives in the energy sector and on possible measures to improve energy productivity in the Australian economy.73

While not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, the Howard government had decided to take other action to mitigate the long-term effects of climate change.74 One of the consequences was that, in 2001, it adopted the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET), a measure with the legislated objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions through encouraging additional renewable electricity generation. The MRET was a key plank in the government’s scheme to achieve its Kyoto Protocol target to hold greenhouse gas emissions at 108 per cent of 1990 levels. The MRET was independently reviewed by a panel chaired by former Northern Territory Country Liberal Party Senator Grant Tambling. Tambling provided the government with the panel’s findings in September 2003.75  

Tambling’s panel found that the MRET had already been so successful in stimulating investment in renewable energy that no further investment in renewable capacity would take place beyond 2007, in the absence of emissions trading. The report proposed a range of options including extending the MRET target to 20,000 GWh and continuing the measure beyond 2020. These options were not adopted. On 22 April 2004 the Cabinet agreed that Howard and Macfarlane should undertake consultations with industry representatives on low emissions technology support before deciding on the proposals. 

The industry consultations took place on 6 May, five weeks before the government released its Energy White Paper on 15 June.76 Some of the states were frustrated by the failure of the Howard government to establish an emissions trading scheme. In these circumstances, the Victorian premier, Steve Bracks, took the lead in promoting state schemes for emissions trading that would become transferable and interoperable.77 In the end, the idea came to nothing.

The energy paper marked a shift from any consideration of emissions trading, which had been rejected by Cabinet in 2003, toward technology development. The most significant announcement was establishing a fund ‘to generate at least $1.5 billion in investment to demonstrate low emission technologies to reduce greenhouse gas from our energy sector’.78 The expenditure was mainly directed at the fossil fuel sector, primarily carbon capture and storage for coal- or gas-fired generation, but it also provided funds to assist with helping to make promising renewable technologies possible.79  
 

Transport, infrastructure, communications, legal issues and cultural affairs

John Anderson, deputy prime minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services, secured Cabinet’s agreement to transfer the regulation of airspace from Airservices Australia to the Department of Transport and Regional Services and to introduce legislation to designate Airservices as a Government Business Enterprise.80  

In respect of telecommunications, Daryl Williams, Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, secured the Cabinet’s agreement for new institutional arrangements to regulate telecommunications and broadcasting. At that time, the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) administered the regulatory framework for broadcasting and online content while the Australian Communications Authority (ACA) administered those for telecommunications and radiocommunications. Williams recommended that a merged regulator would be better placed to deal with rapid technological change and manage resources across different priorities. Cabinet agreed that a merged authority named the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) be established.81  

In respect of a submission from Philip Ruddock, Williams’s successor as attorney-general, and Ian Macfarlane, the Cabinet approved funding to secure resources for 11 Australian Government agencies to implement the government’s policy on critical infrastructure protection (CIP). Critical infrastructure was susceptible to damage, destruction or disruption by acts of terrorism, cyber-attack, criminal activity and malicious damage. Implementing this policy required an effective partnership between the Australian Government and the private sector.82  

Another telecommunications-related submission concerned the sale of Telstra. Following the October 2004 election, in which the Coalition won a majority in the Senate, the Cabinet agreed on 13 December 2004 to consider the sale of the government’s remaining shares in Telstra after a study which would examine the scope for interaction between any sales of Telstra and the ‘Future Fund’.83  

The Future Fund had been announced by Costello during the 2004 election as a scheme to cover the liability of unfunded Commonwealth superannuation. The fund would be established in early 2006 as an independent statutory find administered by a board of guardians. The issue of shares under T3, the third float of Telstra shares, was allocated to the fund so that by August 2007 the fund had been allocated more than $60 billion.84 

In legal affairs, Downer introduced a submission to overhaul the Passports Act 1938. This was necessary to allow for enhanced integrity measures, including biometrics (facial recognition), to strengthen national security and law enforcement measures and to align child passport controls more closely to the administration of family law. Downer recommended that the legislation should state that Australians were ‘entitled’ to a passport, but the Act also provided for the Minister for Foreign Affairs not to issue or to cancel passports in certain circumstances.85 Downer also received authority to introduce a new Fees Bill given the ‘uncertainty concerning the technical legal question of whether the fees were a tax or simply reasonable cost recovery’.86 Consequently, the Australian Passports (Application Fees) Act 2005 imposed passport fees as taxes; this would contribute to Australian passports becoming some of the costliest in the world.87 

Another important legal submission concerned defamation law, which consisted of a mixture of common and statute law. By 2004 the operation of the laws was cumbersome, with national newspapers and broadcasters potentially exposed to eight different defamation laws that might be applied to one publication. The need for uniformity was generally agreed, but there had been no progress for a quarter of a century. Options for the Commonwealth were to press the states to enact uniform laws, to ask the states to refer powers to the Commonwealth or to legislate using existing federal Constitutional powers. In the end, Cabinet adopted the strategy of requesting the states to legislate to provide for uniformity in certain respects.88 If the states were unable, however, to meet the deadline of enacting reforms before January 2006, Ruddock was authorised to bring back to Cabinet a proposal for Commonwealth legislative action.89  

After the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) passed legislation on 10 February 2004 removing the bar to same-sex couples being considered as adoptive parents, the Attorney-General’s Department provided some advice on the Commonwealth’s options in a memorandum dated 27 February 2004. At that time, Western Australia and Tasmania had passed legislation enabling same-sex couples to seek to adopt children, but only Western Australia and the ACT provided for the adoption of a child that was not already a child of a member of the couple or a relative of a member of the couple. The Commonwealth had three options: to disallow whole or part of the ACT legislation; to legislate to the limit of the Commonwealth’s constitutional power to restrict the operation of laws enacted by states and territories in specific areas; or to amend the Commonwealth’s Marriage Act 1961.90 Subsequently, the Howard government introduced changes to the Act to prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages in Australia.91  

Pertaining to matters of cultural affairs, Senator Rod Kemp, Minister for the Arts and Sport, proposed a series of measures, based on a review of the National Museum of Australia (NMA), to refine the NMA’s collection policy and present the primary themes of national history with redeveloped galleries focusing on the European discovery and settlement of Australia and its political, social and economic development.92  
 

Rural and regional issues, water and mining

The 2000s drought, known as the ‘millennium drought’, commenced with low rainfall conditions in 1996 and 1997 and worsened through particularly dry years in 2001 and 2002. By 2003 it was recognised to be the worst on record.93 In 2004 many parts of rural Australia were still in drought and thus eligible to apply for ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ (EC) relief from the federal government.94 

The persistence of severe drought in eastern Australia influenced government policy on management of water in the Murray–Darling Basin.95 The basin, which included towns that voted consistently for the Coalition parties and areas dependent on irrigation for their agriculture, was a natural concern for a Coalition government, one component of which was the National (formerly Country) Party.96  To address the over-allocation of water in the basin, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) had agreed in 2003 to develop a National Water Initiative (NWI) that would indicate specific actions in each jurisdiction on nationally compatible water access entitlements, nationally functioning water markets, best-practice water pricing, integrated environmental management of environmental water measuring, monitoring and information, and urban water reform.97  

The NWI was deemed necessary because of the uneven development of the 1994 COAG water reforms, different water management regimes in the states and general resistance from the states to an inter-governmental regime that tied them to specific actions.98 While the states stressed the importance of water-saving technology to irrigation in the basin, the Commonwealth emphasised the need to secure water allocations to contribute to ‘environmental flows’.99 

This concern, and the persistence of drought, would later see the Howard government reorganise the Murray–Darling Basin Commission into the Murray–Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) and announce a $10 billion National Water Security Plan designed to cap water usage and determine water allocations in the basin.100 Cabinet also monitored the progress of an agreement in COAG in 2000 for a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP). The goal of the plan was to motivate and enable regional communities to use coordinated and targeted action to prevent, stabilise and reverse trends in salinity, particularly dryland salinity.101 

Ministers Costello and Macfarlane made a joint submission on enhancing incentives for exploration for petroleum. The petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT), which commenced operation in 1987, replaced volume-based royalty and crude oil excise arrangements with a regime that extracted a share of a petroleum project’s economic rents (that is, those returns exceeding the level needed to initiate an investment). 

The two ministers were responding to representations from industry to change the risk-reward balance associated with exploration for petroleum in high-risk frontier and deep-water areas through adjustments to the fiscal regime applying to the industry (that is, the PRRT and company tax arrangements). The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet opposed a recommendation from ministers to adjust the PRRT rate in designated frontier areas, but Cabinet’s Ad Hoc Revenue Committee agreed that senior ministers should consider the matter further.102  
 

Indigenous policy

In November 2003 the government received the final Report of the Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), In the hands of the region.103 The decentralised structure of ATSIC, based on regional councils, gave elected representatives real power over funding. In 2002, for example, almost half of the Commonwealth’s $2.5 billion Indigenous-specific spending was controlled by ATSIC. By 2004, however, the approach of elected ATSIC commissioner Geoff Clark to Indigenous policy clashed with the government’s. While Clark insisted on distinct Indigenous political rights, codified in a negotiated agreement called a treaty, Howard argued that reconciliation must remain ‘practical’.104  

Policy differences had emerged, too, between the responsible minister and ATSIC, which after the 2001 election had been subsumed within the larger Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. In June 2002 the Howard government approved a recommendation from Philip Ruddock to review ATSIC’s operations. The report was eventually delivered to his successor in the portfolio, Amanda Vanstone. Although the report did not advocate abolishing ATSIC, it pointed to the limitation of its funding.

As other Indigenous leaders distanced themselves from Clark, whose personal integrity was coming into question, the Labor Opposition indicated on 30 March 2004 that, if it won government, it would abolish ATSIC and replace it with an elected Aboriginal body.105 Emboldened by this revelation, Cabinet agreed on 15 April 2004 to introduce legislation immediately to abolish the ATSIC Board and to establish a non-statutory, government-appointed National Indigenous Council to provide policy advice to the government. It further agreed to transfer all relevant functions, programs, assets and appropriations of ATSIC and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS) to mainstream departments and agencies consistent with their general functions and responsibilities.106 On 28 May 2004 the government introduced legislation to abolish ATSIC; it was passed the following year. 

One of the other major Indigenous policy items considered was a review of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976; this legislation had been conceived by the Whitlam government and passed under Malcolm Fraser’s coalition government. Having previously considered reform of the Act in 2000, Cabinet tasked Amanda Vanstone, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, to consult further and return with a package that could pass the Senate. She accordingly engaged the Northern Territory Government, the Northern Territory Land Councils, ATSIC and various commercial interests, including the mining industry.

Vanstone reported to Cabinet that economic development on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory had been slow and that some of the Land Councils were overly politicised, inefficient and unresponsive to local Aboriginal people and other stakeholders. Vanstone’s proposed reforms were intended to streamline the mining development process, include an increased administrative role for the Northern Territory Government, allow for smaller Land Councils and encourage the devolution of decision-making to regional groups.107  

A 2006 Bill amended the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 and the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 to increase access to Aboriginal land for development, especially exploration and mining, facilitate the leasing of Aboriginal land and the mortgaging of leases, and provide for a system of townships on Aboriginal land.108 As historian Tim Rowse has observed, the abolition of ATSIC and the ‘un-negotiated amendment’ of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act ‘reminded Indigenous Australians that their rights are weak if recognised only in legislation’.109 Other submissions on Indigenous affairs concerned Australian Government assistance for Indigenous education and training.110 

Looking to 2005

After Christmas, a major earthquake struck, with the epicentre off the coast of northern Sumatra, devastating communities along the surrounding coasts of the Indian Ocean. Providing aid to regional countries that were affected became a priority for the Howard government in 2005. With a majority in the Senate, however, the government would turn increasingly to domestic reforms such as industrial relations, while the work of the NSC returned to a more normal level.111  

End notes

1The Coalition parties had won three previous elections, in 1996, 1998 and 2001. For the 2001 election, see David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark victory, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2003. 

2Murray Goot, ‘Missing the wood for the trees: explaining Howard’s 2004 victory’, in Tom Frame (ed.), The Howard government. Volume IV: The desire for change, 2004–2007, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2021, p. 15. Decision of Senior Ministers Without Submission – Finalisation of Decisions Involving Expenditure Prior to the 2004 Election – Senior Ministers’ Decision JH04/0306/SM/2, 31 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/306/2.

3Goot, ‘Missing the wood for the trees’, p. 15. 

4For Opposition Leader Mark Latham’s assessment of the campaign, see Mark Latham, The Latham diaries, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic., 2005, pp. 335–41. 

5Sasha Vukoja, Adapting to strategic uncertainty: the development of self-reliance within the ANZUS alliance in Australian defence policy between 1959 and 1989, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2022; Andrew Blyth, From ANZUS to AUKUS: Howard’s legacy in shaping Australia’s defence strategy, The Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, Analysis Paper 66, April 2024. 

6On the evolution of the office of the prime minister, see Paul Strangio, Paul ’t Hart and James Walter, The pivot of power: Australian prime ministers and political leadership, 1949–2016, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic., 2017. 

7John Howard, Lazarus rising: a personal and political autobiography, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2010, p. 238; Patrick Weller, Cabinet government in Australia, 1901–2006: practices, principles, performance, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2007, pp. 183–84.

8For context, see David Lee, Australia and the world: international relations and global events since Federation, Circa, Melbourne, 2022, Chapter 10. 

9White House press release, ‘President Bush announces major combat operations have ended’, 1 May 2003. 

10National Security Committee Minute, Without Submission – Iraq: Security Environment and Risk Management, NSC Decision JH04/0356/NSC, 15 November 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/356. 

11Cabinet Minute Without Submission – Australian Government Response to the Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies – Cabinet Decision JH04/0169/CAB, 20 July 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/169; National Security Committee Minute Without Submission – Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies – Implementation of Recommendations – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0309/NS, 30 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/309. 

12See David Lee, ‘The 2003 Cabinet papers in context’, National Archives of Australia, 2004, https://www.naa.gov.au/explore-collection/cabinet/latest-cabinet-release/2003-cabinet-papers-context.

13National Security Committee Minute Without Submission – Iraq: Australian Approach – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0015/NS, 10 February 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/15. Letter from Hill to Howard, 5 February 2004. 

14Letter from Hill to Howard, 5 February 2004.

15Robert Draper, To start a war: how the Bush Administration took America into Iraq, Penguin, New York, 2021; Steve Coll, The Achilles trap: Saddam Hussein, the United States and the Middle East, 1979–2003, Allen Lane, New York, 2024; James Bluemel and Dr Renad Mansour, Once upon a time in Iraq: history of a modern tragedy, BBC Books, London, 2020; Thomas E Ricks, The generals: American military command from World War II to today, Penguin, New York, 2012, Chapters 27 and 28; Thomas E Ricks, Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq, Allen Lane, London and New York, 2006. 

16Cabinet Memorandum JH04/0088 – Iraq: Impact of Political Transition on Australia’s Interests, Including Rehabilitation Assistance Strategy – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0088/NS, 9 March 2004, p. 4 of Memorandum, NAA: A14370, JH2004/88. 

17Minute of the National Security Committee, Without Submission – Australian Defence Force Deployments to Iraq, NSC Decision JH04/0256/NS, 12 July 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/256. 

18National Security Minute Without Submission – Iraq Hostage Taking – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0252/NS, 12 July 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/252. 

19Seymour M Hersh, ‘Torture at Abu Ghraib’, The New Yorker, 30 April 2004. 

20National Security Committee Submission JH04/0187 – Iraq: Political Transition: Proposed Australian Strategy – NAA: A14370, JH2004/187, p. 8. 

21National Security Committee Submission JH04/0187 – Iraq: Political Transition: Proposed Australian Strategy – NAA: A14370, JH2004/187,Decision of the National Security Committee JH04/0187/NS, 10 May 2004. 

22Cabinet Submission JH04/264 – Australia’s Engagement Strategy – Next Steps – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0264/NS, 10 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/264. 

23Cabinet Submission JH04/264 – Australia’s Engagement Strategy – Next Steps – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0264/NS, 10 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/264. 

24Cabinet Submission JH04/0223 – Iraq: Political Transition and Australian Strategy – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0223/NS, 16 June 2004, p. 11, NAA: A14370, JH2004/223. Material pertaining to the legal framework for deployments has been exempted from the document under the Archives Act 1983. 

25Cabinet Submission JH04/0284 – Iraq Commercial Strategy: Progress and Next Steps – 16 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/284. 

26Paul A Volcker (Chairman), Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, 27 October 2005 https://star.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/UN_Independent%2….; Caroline Overington, Kickback: inside the Australian Wheat Board scandal, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2007. 

27Cabinet Submission JH04/0150 – Australia–Thailand Free Trade Agreement – Cabinet Decision JH04/0150/CAB, 10 May 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/150; Cabinet Minute Without Submission – Australia–United States of America Free Trade Agreement, Cabinet Decision JH04/0170/CAB, 3 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/170; Cabinet Submission JH04/0130 Australia–United States of America Free Trade Agreement: Implementation Funding Issues – Cabinet Decision JH04/0130/CAB/2, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/130. 

28Cabinet Submission JH04/0185 – East Timor: Possible Contribution to Post-UNMISET UN Mission – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0185/NS, 10 May 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/185. See also National Security Minute JH04/0095 – East Timor – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0095/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/95. 

29Cabinet Submission JH04/0245 – Annual Review of Australian Defence Force Non-Regional Peace Operations – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0245/NS, 12 July 2004, NAA: A14370, JH0204/245. 

30Cabinet Minute Without Submission – East Timor: Maritime Boundary Negotiations – Cabinet Decision JH04/0099/CAB/3, 30 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/99/2. 

31Tom Allard, ‘ASIS chief Nick Warner slammed over East Timor spy scandal’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 2016; ‘Australia Defends East Timor Spy Row Raid’, BBC, 4 December 2013; Marian Wilkinson and Peter Cronau, ‘Drawing the line’, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 17 March 2018.

32Cabinet Submission JH04/0272 – ASIS Guidelines on the Use of Weapons and Self Defence Techniques – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0272/NS, 10 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/272, p. 4. 

33Cabinet Submission JH04/0237 – New Zealand: Maritime Boundaries Delimitation Agreement – Cabinet Decision JH04/0237/CAB, 12 July 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/237. 

34Cabinet Submission JH04/0342 – Government Response to Senate References Committee Report: ‘Bali 2002 – Security Threats to Australians in South East Asia’ – Cabinet Decision JH04/0342/CAB, 15 November 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/342. 

35White Paper on Terrorism – Under the Line Discussion – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0188/NS, 10 May 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/188; National Security Minute 04/0230 – White Paper on Terrorism – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0230/NS, 16 June 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/230. Transnational terrorism: the threat to Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004; Cabinet Minute Without Submission – Multi-Jurisdictional Counter-Terrorism Exercise – Mercury 2004 – National Security Committee Decision NS04/0094/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/94. 

36Cabinet Memorandum JH04/0381 – Offshore Maritime Security – Oil and Gas Facilities and Ship Interdiction – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0381/NS, 7 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/381. 

37National Security Minute – Air 9000 Phase 2: Additional Troop-Lift Helicopters – Second Pass Approval – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0310/NS, 30 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/310; National Security Committee Minute – Sea 4000: Selection of Australian Ship Builder – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0311/NS, 30 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/311; Cabinet Submission JH04/0385 – Air 9000 Phase 5A – Chinook Early Engine Upgrade Second Pass Approval – National Security Committee Decision, JH04/0385/NS, 7 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/385; Cabinet Submission JH04/0079 – SEA4000 Phase 1C – Air Warfare Destroyer – Concept Design Phase – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0079/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/79; Cabinet Submission JH04/0247 – SEA 1390 Phase 4B SM-1 Missile Replacement – Second Pass Approval – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0247/NS, 12 July 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/247; Cabinet Submission JH04/0118 – SEA 1654 Phase 2A – HMAS Westralia Replacement – Second Pass Approval – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0118, 29 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/118; Cabinet Submission JH04/0266 – Project SEA1405 – FLIR/ESM/ECM (Forward Looking Infra Red/Electronic Support Measures/Electronic Counter Measures) Upgrade to the Seahawk Fleet – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0266/NS, 10 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/266; Cabinet Submission JH04/0265 – SEA 4000 Phase 1D – Air Warfare Destroyer – Combat System Architecture – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0265/NS, 10 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/265; Cabinet Submission JH04/0182 – Holsworthy Special Forces Training Facilities – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0182/NS, 10 May 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/182; Cabinet Submission JH04/0071 – SEA 1442 Phase 3 – Maritime Communications and Information Management Architecture Modernisation – 2nd Pass Approval – Decision of National Security Committee JH04/0071/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/71; Cabinet Submission JH04/0073 – Land 907 – Main Battle Tank Replacement – Second Pass Approval – National Security Decision JH04/0073/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/73.

38Cabinet Submission JH04/0043 – 2004–2005 Budget – Defence Portfolio Budget Submission – Cabinet Decision JH04/0043/CAB/4, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/43. 

39Cabinet Submission JH04/0072 – Implementing the Two-Pass Approval Process – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0072/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/72. 

40Cabinet Submission JH04/0344 – Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Rationalisation Project – Stage Two, Fishermen’s Bend, Victoria – NSC Decision JH04/0344/NSC, 15 November 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/344.

41Cabinet Submission JH04/0209 – Activity in Support of Australia’s Decision to Participate in the United States’ Ballistic Missile Defence Program – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0209/NS, 16 June 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/209. 

42Cabinet Submission JH04/0079 – SEA 4000 Phase 1C – Air Warfare Destroyer – Concept Design Phase – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0079/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/79; Cabinet Submission JH04/0265 – SEA 4000 Phase 1D – Air Warfare Destroyer – Combat System Architecture – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0265/NS, 10 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/265; Cabinet Submission JH04/0247 – SEA 1390 Phase 4B SM-1 Missile Replacement – Second Pass Approval – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0247/NS, 12 July 2004, NAA; A14370, JH2004/247. 

43Cabinet Submission JH04/0079, p. 6. 

44Cabinet Submission JH04/0386 – Air 5276 Phase 4 AP-3C Electronic Warfare Self Protection Expedited Acquisition – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0386/NS, 7 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/386. 

45Simon Jeffery and Mark Oliver, ‘Australian embassy bomb kills nine’, The Guardian, 10 September 2004; Cabinet Minute Without Submission – Bomb Blast – Australian Embassy, Jakarta – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0313/NS, 11 September 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/313. 

46Cabinet Submission JH04/0884 – Solomon Islands: RAMSI: Quarterly Update – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0084/NS, 9 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/84; Cabinet Submission JH04/0214 – Solomon Islands: RAMSI: Quarterly Update – Cabinet Decision JH04/0214/NS, 16 June 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/214. See also Bob Breen, The good neighbour: Australian peace support operations in the Pacific Islands, 1980–2006, The official history of Australian peacekeeping, humanitarian and post–Cold War operations. Volume V, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, Vic., 2016; Jon Fraenkel, ‘Reassessing the 2003–17 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 169, No. 1, 2019, pp. 52–61. 

47Charles Hawksley, ‘The intervention you have when you’re not having an intervention’: Australia, PNG and the Enhanced Cooperation Program’, Social Alternatives, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2005, pp. 34–39. 

48Cabinet Submission JH04/0343/NSC – Papua New Guinea: Defence Cooperation Program – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0343/NSC, 15 November 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/343. 

49‘We’ll bring troops home, says Latham’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 2004; ‘Latham admits he made Christmas decision alone’, The Age, 1 April 2004. 

50Peter Costello with Peter Coleman, The Costello memoirs, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic., 2008, p. 204.

51Tom Frame, ‘Setting the scene’ in Tom Frame (ed.), The Howard government. Volume IV. The desire for change, 2004–2007, pp. 5–6. 

52Cabinet Submission JH04/0395 – Implementing Superannuation Choice and Ongoing Government Commitment the National Consumer and Financial Literacy – Cabinet Decision JH04/0395/CAB, 13 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/395. 

53Murray Goot, ‘Missing the wood for the trees: explaining Howard’s 2004 victory’, p. 23. 

54Murray Goot, ‘Missing the wood for the Trees: explaining Howard’s 2004 victory’, p. 23.

55Submission JH04/0222 – Government Response to the Productivity Commission Inquiry Report on First Home Ownership – Cabinet Decision JH04/0222/CAB, 21 June 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/222. See also Greg Jericho, ‘The awful truth at the heart of Australian housing policy’, The Guardian, 15 February 2024; Alan Kohler, ‘The great divide: Australia’s housing mess and how to fix it’, Quarterly Essay 92, November 2023; and Keith Mitchelson, ‘Was the housing crisis caused by the Howard government’s policies?’, The New Daily, 16 September 2024. 

56Submission JH04/004 – Improving Access to Medicare and after-hours General Practitioner Services – Cabinet Decision JH04/0004/CAB/2, 16 February 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/4.

57Cabinet Submission JH04/0086 – Reduction of Family Assistance Overpayments – Cabinet Decision JH04/0086/CAB, 8 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/86. 

58Cabinet Submission JH04/0372 – Supported Accommodation Assistance Program: Australian Government Offers to the States and Territories – Cabinet Decision JH04/0372/CAB, 13 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/372; Cabinet Submission JH04/0080 – Renegotiation of the Home and Community Care (HACC) Specific Purpose Payment (SPP) Agreement – Cabinet Decision JH04/0880/CAB, 8 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/80.

59Rick Morton, ‘The collapse of aged care (part one)’, The Saturday Paper, 12–18 September 2020; Sarah Russell, ‘The aged care crisis can be traced back to Howard’s Aged Care Act. We need a new act’, The Guardian, 20 April 2018. 

60Cabinet Submission JH04/0074 – The Review of Pricing Arrangements in Residential Aged Care – Cabinet Decision JH04/0074/CAB, 8 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/74. 

61Cabinet Submission JH04/0362 – Department of Education, Science and Training Portfolio Budget Submission – Special ERC 2004 – Cabinet Decision JH04/0362/CAB/2, 6 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/362.

62Cabinet Memorandum JH04/0376 – People Smuggling Taskforce Strategic Assessment of People Smuggling to Australia 2004–05 – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0376/NSC, 7 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/376. 

63Cabinet Submission JH04/0098/CAB – Update on the Whole of Government Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Persons – Cabinet Decision JH04/0098/CAB, 29 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/98. 

64Cabinet Submission JH04/0370 – Illegal Foreign Fishers in Australia’s Northern Waters – Cabinet Decision JH04/0370/CAB, 6 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/370. 

65Cabinet Submission JH04/0069 – 2004–05 Humanitarian Program, Cabinet Decision JH04/0069/CAB, 22 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/69.

66Cabinet Submission JH04/0068 – 2004–05 Migration (Non-Humanitarian) Program – Cabinet Decision JH04/0068/CAB/2, 29 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/68.

67Roger Beale, ‘Energy and the environment’ in Frame (ed.), The Howard government. Volume IV. The desire for change, 2004–2007, p. 161. 

68Cabinet Submission JH04/0046 – 2004–05 Budget – Climate Change Forward Strategy – Cabinet Decision JH04/0046/CAB/3, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/46. 

69Cabinet Submission JH04/0046 – 2004–05 Budget – Climate Change Forward Strategy – Cabinet Decision JH04/0046/CAB/3, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/46. 

70Cabinet Submission JH04/0046 – 2004–05 Budget – Climate Change Forward Strategy – Cabinet Decision JH04/0046/CAB/3, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/46, ‘Coordination Comments’, p. 19. 

71Cabinet Memorandum – National Energy Policy: Implementation of Energy Committee Decisions – Cabinet Decision JH04/0177/CAB/2, 22 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/177. 

72Cabinet Memorandum – National Energy Policy: Implementation of Energy Committee Decisions – Cabinet Decision JH04/0177/CAB/2, 22 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/177. 

73Cabinet Memorandum – Energy Innovation and Technology – Cabinet Decision JH04/0112/CAB/2, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH04/0112; Cabinet Memorandum – Energy Efficiency: Proposals for Improving Australia’s Energy Efficiency Performance, NAA: A14370, JH2004/112. 

74Howard, Lazarus rising, pp. 549–51. 

75Memorandum JH04/0115 – The Government Response to the Review of the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target – Cabinet Decision JH04/0115/CAB/4, 22 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/115. 

76Securing Australia’s energy future, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 2004. 

77‘States push emissions trade plan’, The Age, 18 September 2004. 

78‘States push emissions trade plan’, The Age, 18 September 2004; ‘PM called talks to derail renewable energy’, The Age, 3 October 2004; Howard, Lazarus rising, p. 555. 

79Roger Beale, ‘Energy and the environment’, p. 152. 

80Cabinet Submission JH04/0117 – Establishment of an Airspace Authority – Cabinet Decision JH04/0117/CAB, 29 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH04/117. 

81Cabinet Submission JH04/0111 – New Institutional Arrangements for Regulation of Telecommunications and Broadcasting – Cabinet Decision JH04/0111/CAB, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/111. 

82Cabinet Submission JH04/0056 – 2004–05 Reference Copy Budget – Critical Infrastructure Protection – Cabinet Decision JH04/0056/CAB/2, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/56. See also Cabinet Submission JH04/0186 – Strategic Policy Statement for Critical Infrastructure Protection – National Security Committee Decision JH04/0186/NS, 10 May 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/186. 

83Cabinet Minute Without Submission – Issues Relating to the Sale of Telstra – Cabinet Decision JH04/0408/CAB, 13 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/408. 

84Costello with Coleman, The Costello memoirs, pp. 264–67.

85Cabinet Submission JH04/0002 – Passports Act Revision – Cabinet Decision JH04/2002/CAB, 16 February 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/2. For context, see Jane Doulman and David Lee, Every assistance and protection: a history of the Australian passport, The Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 2008, Chapter 8. 

86Cabinet Submission JH04/0002, p. 8. 

87Australian Passports (Application Fees) Act 2005; ‘Australian passport prices have increased. Why do they cost so much?’, SBS Australia, 23 February 2023. 

88Cabinet Submission JH04/0394 – National Uniform Defamation Law – Cabinet Decision JH04/0394/CAB, 13 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/394. 

89Cabinet Submission JH04/0394 – National Uniform Defamation Law – Cabinet Decision JH04/0394/CAB, 13 December 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/394. 

90Cabinet Memorandum JH04/0042, 27 February 2004 – Response to State and Territory legislation Concerning Same-Sex Couples and Possible Changes to the Marriage Act 1961, NAA: A14370, JH2004/42. 

91‘Howard to ban gay marriages’, The Age, 27 May 2004. 

92Cabinet Submission JH04/0282 – National Museum of Australia – Exhibition and Public Program Review Implementation – 12 August 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/282.

93‘Worst drought on record’, ABC Rural News, 3 September 2003. 

94Submission JH04/0242 – Exceptional Circumstances (EC) Assistance to Existing EC Areas – Cabinet Decision JH04/0242/CAB, 12 July 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/242. 

95Nick Economou and Zareh Ghazarian, ‘The Howard government and the rise of the Australian Greens’, in Frame (ed.), The Howard government. Volume IV. The desire for change, 2004–2007, p. 199. 

96Howard, Lazarus rising, pp. 556–58. 

97Memorandum JH04/0033 – Progress with National Water Initiative and Funding to Address Water Overallocation in the Murray–Darling Basin – Cabinet Decision JH04/0033/CAB/2, 8 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/33. 

98Memorandum JH04/0176 – Options for Finalising the National Water Initiative – Cabinet Decision JH04/0176/CAB 22 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/176; Cabinet Submission JH04/0216 – Council of Australian Governments Meeting – June 2004 – Cabinet Decision JH04/0216/CAB, 15 June 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/216. 

99Economou and Ghazarian, ‘The Howard government and the rise of the Australian Greens’, p. 200. 

100Economou and Ghazarian, ‘The Howard government and the rise of the Australian Greens’, p. 200. 

101Cabinet Submission JH04/0035 – Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality and Natural Heritage Trust – Cabinet Decision JH04/0035/CAB/2, 8 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/35. 

102Cabinet Submission – Offshore Petroleum Exploration Incentive – Decision of Ad Hoc Revenue, Committee JH04/0156/AH, 14 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/156. John Freebairn, ‘PRRT explained: why aren’t we benefitting from the resource tax?’, The Conversation, 31 October 2016; Diane Kraal, ‘Is Australia “giving away” its natural resources?’, The Conversation, 14 August 2024.

103Alison Holland, ‘Many claim Australia’s longest-running Indigenous body failed. Here’s why that’s wrong’, The Conversation, 24 July 2024. 

104Tim Rowse, ‘Indigenous affairs’, in Frame (ed.), The Howard government. Volume IV: The desire for change, pp. 135–36. For Howard’s views on the government’s Indigenous policies, see Howard, Lazarus rising, Chapter 25. 

105Howard, Lazarus rising, p. 136. 

106Cabinet Minute – Without Submission Indigenous Affairs and the Future of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission – Cabinet Decision JH04/0163/CAB, 15 April 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/163. 

107Cabinet Submission JH04/0039 – Reform of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 – Cabinet Decision JH04/0039/CAB, 29 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/39. 

108Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Act 2006

109Rowse, ‘Indigenous affairs’, p. 141. 

110Cabinet Submission JH04/0103 – Australian Government Specific Purpose Payment (SPP) for Indigenous Education for 2005–2008 – Second Submission – Cabinet Decision JH04/0103/CAB, 25 March 2004, NAA: A14370, JH2004/103; Cabinet Submission JH04/0019 – Australian Government Specific Purpose Payment (SPP) for Indigenous Education for 2005–2008 – Second Submission, 11 February 2004, NAA: A24370, JH2004/19. 

111Weller, Cabinet government, p. 187.